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Abstract: When emergency breaks out, the problem how to make timely and efficiently the emergency decision is focus issue in 
emergency management. So an engineering model is established by using dynamic games firstly. Then the process of sequential 
games between decision maker and emergency is analyzed in detail. The information about emergency is got through finitely 
sequential games in order to bring forth the optimal relief plan and to provide support for the decision-making when an 
emergency occurs. Finally, the optimal relief plan that was generated by using the engineering model of sequential games is 
given by a specific example.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Desheng Dash Wu
Keywords: emergency decision-making ; sequential games; relief plans
1. Introduction
Although there are few studies on applying game theory in emergency management at present, some research 
results have been achieved. The game scheduling model of rescue resources to multiple locations is proposed by 
Shetty, R, and Gupta, U. (2007) in order to discuss the programs of fair and reasonable scheduling resources, which 
is not consistent with the actual situation because the game model was based on complete information. As far as the 
scheduling of rescue resources from resource centers to crisis locations is concerned, multiple transportation modes 
such as air shipment, road shipment and water shipment and so on may be used synchronously to rapidly and 
efficiently deliver rescue resources to crisis location. A multi-model layer network for rescue resources scheduling is 
conceived by Yang, J.J, Wu, Q.D., and Cheng, Y. ( 2008). Yao, J., Ji, L., and Chi, H. (2005) also present the model 
of dynamic game model, which possesses obvious defect that the optimal scheme is determined on basis of 
minimum cost. After analyzing the relationship between decision-makers and emergency, an engineering model 
based on sequential games is established.
2. Analysis of emergency decision based on sequential game
2.1. Basic concept of sequential games
Sequential game is a game which one player chooses his action after the others have chosen theirs. Importantly, 
the later player must have some information about the first player. Extensive form representation is usually used in
sequential games, because it can explicitly illustrate the sequential aspects of a game. One of the hypotheses in 
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sequential games is sequential rationality (Kreps ,D, and Wilson R. 1982), which player’s choice is the optimality of 
subsequent play. 
Let ),( PG be a state of sequential game, where G represents the set of strategies taken by all players, P is the 
probability distribution that each player takes his own action under the given h of the information set. 
2.2. Sequential decision-making process in emergency management
The problem of sequential game in emergency management has the following features: ķemergencies are a
process of dynamic development and evolution; ĸ emergency information is imperfect, from obscure to clear,
incomplete to complete; Ĺ with more and more information being obtained, the relief plan enacted under incomplete 
information should be adjusted at any time; ĺ on basis of the states of emergency and stage results of disaster relief, 
the decision maker should modify his belief in order to lay down a new relief plan. The process of sequential games 
between decision makers and emergency is as shown in Fig 1.
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Fig 1. Process of sequential games under incomplete information
Where, },,,{ 3210 ttttt  is a set of time point that decision-maker adopts a new relief plan;
},,{ 210 TTTT  denotes a set of stage that the relief plan should be implemented; tW refers to the emergency state at 
t ; tV is a relief plan that should be used at t .
There exist only two players who are decision makers and emergency in sequential games. The process of 
sequential games under incomplete information is completely illustrated as follows: 
(1) 10 tt o represents 0T . After emergency broke out, casualties and property loss were caused, which would be 
in their own state.
(2) 21 tt o denotes 1T . According to observing the state of emergency, decision makers are able to judge its 
probability (i.e. prior probability). Due to extreme lack of information about emergency, decision makers can amend 
the prior probability of emergency by using the historical data and expert’s judgment. The prior probability amended 
is called the posterior probability. In accordance with the posterior probability and the expected payoff
maximization principle, the optimal relief plan is selected.
(3) With the implementation of the relief plan in 1T , emergency would evolve from original state to a new state
according to its own evolution.
(4) 32 tt o is 2T . At first, decision makers assess the relief plan adopted .Then decision makers begin to amend 
the belief of emergency state on basis of the new information collected and the expert’s judgment. The posterior 
probability of emergency state is calculated by using Bayesian formula in order to select a new relief plan.
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(5) With the implementation of the new relief plan in 2T , emergency would evolve into another state, and 
decision makers must draw up a new relief plan according to the actual situation until emergency can be effectively 
controlled.
3. Engineering model of emergency decision based on sequential games
The engineering model of emergency decision based on sequential games is described below:
3.1ˊPlayers N
In emergency management, there are two players who are decision makers and emergency. ^ `2,1 N is the non-
empty set of players(emergency and decision makers), Where, 1 denotes emergency; 2 refers to decision makers.
3.2. Information set )(xh
Information set is information collection of emergency that decision makers can observe and obtain before 
making decision. In the sequential games of incomplete information, for each information set, decision makers must 
have a belief ( P ) on how to take action when the decision note ( x ) is arrived. )(xh is a set of information set that 
decision makers possess. In emergency management, due to the unpredictability and suddenness of emergency, the 
decision makers must quickly make emergency decision under incomplete information and rapidly implement the 
rescue. 
3.3. Action strategy V
Action strategy (V ) refers to the actions that players take in each decision node. In emergency management, 
assuming that emergency may have J ( J is a set of crisis states). Decision makers must infer the emergency’s state 
and modify its prior probability in order to select the optimal relief plan from K ( K is the set of relief plans) 
according to the current state and the outcome of stage relief.
3.4. Payoff function P
In the game process of emergency management, there is a zero-sum sequential game between decision makers
and emergency, i.e. 021   PP . Where, 1P is the payoff of emergency, 2P denotes the payoff of decision makers. 
So study on decision makers’ payoff function is sufficient in sequential games. The payoff function of decision 
makers at t is the compound function, which is modelled as follows:
),,,( tktktjtt ctPP VW                                                                              (1)
Where, tjW ),,2,1( Jj  is the emergency state at t (emergency state is jointly determined by its type, 
criticality, stage and response time); tkV denotes action strategy (relief plans); tkc refers to rescue costs.
Because of incomplete information about emergency, the decision makers must make full use of expert’s
experience and knowledge in order to determine the optimal relief plan. Taking into account the subjective 
preference of different experts to different relief plan, the decision weight of experts is introduced below:
),,,,,( 21 Vtk
v
tktktkt wwwwW  
1
1
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v
v
tkw ˈ Vv ,,2,1                                                                       (2)
Where, vtkw denotes the subjective preference of v ( eVv and },,,,2,1{ VvVe  is a set of experts) to 
k ( Kk ) at t .
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),,,( tktktjv ctP VW is the payoff function of v . In order to simplify the problem study, it assumes that expert’s 
preference to relief plan is described indirectly by improved payoff function ),,,,( vtktktktjv wctP VW ˈi.e.
),,,(),,,,( tktktjv
v
tk
v
tktktktjv ctPwwctP VWVW                                             (3)
Without loss of generality, payoff function is designed to meet the following principles:
(1) Relief plan is associated with the amount of resources that are transferred to the disaster areas. So the payoff 
of the relief plan is proportional to the amount of resources ( tjkq ) that is provided to the disaster area in certain stage;
(2) Payoff is proportional to the subjective preference ( tkw ) of each expert owned for the relief plan;
(3) Payoff function is inversely proportional to the cost ( tkc ) of the selected relief plan.
Therefore, the payoff function is given as follows:
tk
tjk
v
tkt
v c
qw
P
T
                                                                                  (4)
Where, tjkq is the amount of rescue resources when tkV is selected in tjW ; tT denotes the conflict coefficient of 
resource demand.
The total payoff function ( tP ) of decision makers which are made up of eV is designed as follows:
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                                                           (5)
3.5. Expected payoff
At t, emergency decision makers maximize their expected payoff by taking the optimal relief plan. The expected 
payoff is defined as )(
1
jj
J
j
tt IPP WP¦
 
 , Where, )( ji IWP denotes posterior probability; jI refers to the information 
set of emergency in jW . When the new information set ( jI ) occurs and conditional probability )( jjI WP is got, the 
posterior probability )( ji IWP of emergency in jW is given according to Bayes formula (6):
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Where, )( jWP is prior probability of emergency in jW .
3.6. Objective function of game model
The goal of decision makers is to maximize the payoff of the relief plan when emergency can be controlled 
effectively. The objective function of game model is defined as.
¦
 
 
T
t
tPP
1
max   Tt ,,2,1                                                         (7)
4. Example analysis
As an example of flood disaster in area ĉ.There is only two states of disaster when flood erupts, which 
1W denotes general, 2W refers to serious. And there is only one local rescue center in the areaĉ. In addition, there are 
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another two national rescue centers nearby. Two emergency experts provide decision support, which their weights
are equal, i.e. 5.021   ww . The entire rescue process is divided into two stages as shown in Fig 2.
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Fig 2. Process of 2-stage dynamic sequential games
Where, number in the end node is the payoff of decision makers. 
In the first stage, when emergency breaks, there is only one relief plan ( 1V ), i.e. the local rescue center will 
implement the rescue. If the state of emergency is 2W , it is necessary for decision makers to enter the second stage, 
which the national rescue centers are asked to implement the rescue.
In the second stage, there are two relief plans: (ϸ) one of national rescue centers will join disaster rescue, which 
the relief plan is called 2V ; (ξ) two national rescue centers will be asked to join disaster rescue, which is called 3V .
4.1. In the first stage
The figure 2 shows the states of emergency can be judged as follows: ķ if disaster severity is 1W , then the
probability is 0.4 ( 4.0)( 1  WP ); ĸif disaster severity is 2W , the probability is 0.6 ( 6.0)( 2  WP ). In the first stage, 
when emergency bursts out, because of limitation of information about emergency, decision makers can judge the 
state of emergency under the help of experts. The accuracies of two experts’ judgment are assumed to be 0.8 and 0.7 
respectively. So their respective conditional probabilities are expressed as follows:
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On basis of the judgment of the first expert, the posterior probability of emergency is calculated according to (6). 
There are two cases to discuss respectively:
(1) When emergency state of the first expert’s judgment is 1e , the posterior probability of emergency state is 
calculated below:
73.0)( 111 |eWP ˈ 27.073.01)( 121   eWP .
(2) When emergency state of the first expert’s judgment is 2e , the posterior probability of emergency state is 
calculated as follows:
14.0)( 211 |eWP ˈ 86.014.01)( 221   eWP
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Similarly, the posterior probabilities of emergency state are calculated according to the judgment of the second 
expert:
61.0)( 112 |eWP ˈ 39.0)( 122  eWP ˗ 22.0)( 212 |eWP ˈ 78.0)( 222  eWP
From the above results, we can draw the following conclusions:
ķ If emergency state of two experts’ judgments is 1e , emergency can be effectively controlled only by 
implementing rapidly 1V . So disaster relief operations will not enter the second stage.
ĸ If emergency state of two experts’ judgments is 2e , after implementing rapidly 1V , decision makers must 
immediately seek help from the national rescue centers. So disaster relief operations will enter the second stage.
4.2. In the second stage
Before the second stage, with the implementation of the relief plan ( 1V ) and the collection of information, 
decision makers will amend the judgment of emergency state. The comprehensive probability of emergency state in 
the first stage is used as the prior probability in the second stage. So the prior probabilities are calculated as 
follows˖
)()()( 212221111 ewew WPWPWP  18.022.05.014.05.0  uu ˗ 82.018.01)( 2   WP
At this time, assume that the emergency state ( iW ) is consistent with the collected information ( iI ), the 
conditional probabilities of the first expert are given as follows˖
9.0)( 111  WP I ˈ 1.0)( 121  WP I ˗ 1.0)( 211  WP I ˈ 8.0)( 221  WP I
Similarly, the conditional probabilities of the second expert are assumed to be:
8.0)( 112  WP I ˈ 2.0)( 122  WP I ˗ 15.0)( 212  WP I ˈ 7.0)( 222  WP I
According to the first expert’s conditional probabilities, the posterior probabilities are calculated as follows.
66.0)( 111  IWP ˈ 34.066.01)( 121   IWP ˗ 03.0)( 211  IWP 97.003.01)( 221   IWP
From the above results, we can also draw the following conclusions:
ķ At this time, when the state information of emergency that the first expert can collect is 1I , the actual state is 
1W . If 2V and 3V are implemented respectively, their payoffs are 20 and 5 in the Fig.3. When the state information 
of emergency that the first expert can collect is 1I , but the actual state is 2W . If 2V and 3V are implemented 
respectively, their payoffs are 10 and 15. So their expected payoffs by implementing 2V and 3V are calculated 
respectively as follows.
6.161034.02066.0
21
 uu VP ˈ 4.831  VP
Because there is
32 11 VV PP ! , so the first expert recommends that 2V should be adopted. 
ĸ when the state information that the first expert can collect is 2I , but the actual state is 1W . If 2V and 3V are 
implemented respectively, their payoffs are 20 and 5 in the Fig.3. When the emergency state information that the 
first expert can collect is 1I , the actual state is 2W . If 2V and 3V are implemented respectively, their payoffs are 10 
and 15. So their expected payoffs by implementing 2V and 3V are given respectively as follows˖
3.101097.02003.0
21
 uu VP ˈ 7.1431  VP
Because there is
32 11 VV PP  , the first expert recommends that 3V should be implemented.
Similarly, according to the second expert’s conditional probabilities, the posterior probabilities are calculated.
54.0)( 112 |IWP ˈ 46.0)( 122  IWP ˗ 06.0)( 212 |IWP ˈ 94.0)( 222  IWP
On basis of the second expert’s posterior probabilities, we can make the following judgment˖
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ķ If the state information about emergency that the second expert can collect is 1I , by implementing 2V and 
3V respectively, their expected payoffs are calculated as follows:
4.151046.02054.0
22
 uu VP ˈ 6.932  VP
Because there is
32 22 VV PP ! , the second expert recommends that 2V should be adopted rapidly.
ĸ When the state information is 2I , if 2V and 3V are implemented respectively, their expected payoffs are 
calculated as follows:
8.101094.02006.0
22
 uu VP ˈ 4.1432  VP
Because there is
32 22 VV PP  , the second expert recommends that 3V should be carried out.
In the second stage, the decision makers draw up the following relief plan by using the two experts’ 
recommendations:
1˅If the collected information about emergency is 1I , decision makers should adopted 2V immediately. At this 
time, the maximum expected payoff is given as 16
22 2211
  VV PwPwP
2˅If the collected information about emergency is 2I , 3V should be implemented immediately. Then the 
maximum expected payoff is 55.14
22 2211
  VV PwPwP .
To sum up, the optimal relief plan is generated by using the sequential game model as follows:
(1) In the first stage, if decision makers judge under the help of experts that emergency state is 1e ( 1W ), so 1V
should immediately carried out, i.e. the local rescue center must launch a rescue mission.
(2) In the first stage, if decision makers judge under the help of experts that emergency state is 2e ( 2W ), rescue 
work must enter the second stage. In addition to immediately implementing 1V , decision makers should collect the 
related information about emergency. If the collected information is 1I , then 2V should be carried out, i.e. the 
decision makers immediately ask for help from one of national rescue centers. Otherwise, 3V should be launched, 
which the decision makers immediately seek help from two national rescue centers.
5. Summary
Due to many characteristics such as suddenness, unpredictability, dynamic evolution and so on in emergency, the 
information about emergency that decision makers can get is incomplete. For this reason, the engineering model 
between emergency and decision makers based on sequential game is established, in which experts’ judgment is 
introduced. By analyzing example, the engineering model fully reflects the process of emergency decision-making, 
which decision makers must dynamically amend the relief plans according to the disposal results of stage and the 
collected information. So this research has importantly theoretical and practical value.
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